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described in the following studies: (Oluwasanmi, 1966; Abdullahi, 2002; Ehui and Tsigas, 2009; Adebimpe and Akande, 2011; Umar et al., 2011; Adenugba and Dipo, 2013; Raji and Abejide, 2013; David et al., 2016; Jackson et al., 2016; Abiwon, 2017; KPMG, 2017; Pwc, 2017; Abimbola and Adedibu, 2018) . On the contrary, the question, how do
we produce from what we have? Has not gained much ground, as the former, with respect to iron ore and agricultural production. Interestingly, these have brought up two factions. First, are those of the argument that harnessing small scale artisanal mining techniques, modular techniques and local agricultural technology are capable of producing from what we have. Although its produce might not be of the best quality, its utilization could serve as an incentive (reduction in the amount spent on the importation of capital equipment) to Nigerian policymakers, if exploited and modified (Mogbo, 2000; Azogu, 2009; Ogunyemi and Adedokun, 2012; Okafor, 2014; Sani et al., 2014; Deloitte, 2016) . The second faction are those of the argument that: the importation of capital goods is most suitable for sustaining Nigeria"s manufacturing sector, hence, needed to produce what we have, in order to enhance productivity and sustain economic growth, (Douglason, 2010; Ojide and Ojide, 2014; Damilola, 2014a; Damilola, 2014b) .
No doubt, both factions exhibits a great deal of logic; however, the latter (i.e. necessity for the importation of capital goods in sustaining Nigeria"s manufacturing sector), seem to be a topic that captures the interest of many Nigerian economists (authors), relative to the former (i.e. harnessing small scale artisanal and local technology in production), owing to the disparity, in the number of literatures reviewed on both subjects.
Regardless of the low interest shown by Nigerian economists, in the former topic, the production and sustenance of iron ore are of major concern in this write-up, as it stands to be one amongst a myriad of "what we have (natural resources)". Hence, exploring its sustenance with respect to available scarce resources is a necessity.
Though its discourse has gained little attention, amongst Nigerian economists, it's potential (As described by Ocheri et al. (2017) ; United Nations Development Programme (2014); Ilori (1996) ) has earned it a consideration in national discourse on economic diversification alongside agriculture by policymakers. However, it is worthy to note that, its potential isn"t a sufficient measure for ascertaining its efficient production, for efficiency and sustenance, are two basic economic indicators that define a venture worthy of sustainable economic welfare, in the short or long runs. To this end, sustaining Nigeria"s economic growth through the production of iron ore could be said to be feasible, if its known potentials are transformed efficiently into final output (for industrial use). The question is, do Nigeria, as a country have the capacity to effect and sustain the intricacies surrounding this transformation in the short-run? Where the maintenance of sophisticated mining equipment, fabrication of spare parts for wore out mining equipment needed for the production of iron ore isn"t within her control, at the moment.
Locations of Iron Ore Deposits in Nigeria
With reference to Table 1 the values in the column labelled "Estimated reserves", is vital for the economic assessment of any mineral deposit, because it measures the quantity of mineral contained in a mineral deposit (Howard, 1987) . In fact, this estimate is a reflection of the commerciality of a mineral deposit measured in metric tons. The higher the value of the estimate, the greater its suitability for trade (return on investment). In sum, the values of the estimated reserves shown in Table 1 ranks the Agbaja iron ore deposit (with, 2billion metric tons of iron ore in commercial quantity) above all other, iron ore deposits in Nigeria, in terms of commerciality. Figure 1 shows a map of Nigeria showing iron deposits areas. advantageous for a country to develop her iron and steel industry, but this depends on the availability of resources, needed to effect it". To this end, in order to sustain the production of iron ore (as a commodity) in Nigeria, policymakers must always place the aforementioned factors at the lead of its plan.
Available Technology vs Nigeria's Iron Ore Extraction
Attaining efficiency and quality ore concentrates has been characterized by the use of sophisticated earthmoving equipment, such as hydraulic shovel, bulldozers, soil compactors, rotary drill, etc. in the extraction of ore deposits, Howard (1987) . Unfortunately, according to Osemenam and Afeni (2018) some of the earthmoving equipment procured for the extraction of iron ore at NIOMCO (National Iron Ore Mining Company), which is Nigeria's iron ore company, have been exposed to a long period of rainfall, since the year, 2011. In fact, the lifespan of some, of the equipment haven"t been utilized. Based on this, it is not illogical, to conclude that some of the procured equipment and its component would require replacement, for extraction to take place. In a nutshell, the use of sophisticated equipment and some of its parts, can"t be ignored, as Nigeria seek to sustain the production of iron ore concentrates, alongside, economic welfare. The main concern is, as a country, are these equipment within our productive capacity? Do we have any available alternative that is capable of withstanding the production intensity at various stages of iron ore exploitation and production at the moment? Is there a likelihood of a costly economic trade-off, if we choose to utilize the most feasible option at our disposal?
Equipment Specification for the Extraction of Nigeria's Iron Ore Deposit
© 2019 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved. Assuming a worst-case scenario, where Nigerian policymakers agree to procure (import) at least a unit of the above-specified equipment, to sustain the mining of iron ore, at Itakpe deposit, on the basis that most, of the earthmoving equipment have been exposed, to a long period of rainfall, since, the year, 2011. Hence, the likelihood that its engine has been exposed to heavy rainfall resulting to its damage, is a feasible event, Osemenam and Afeni (2018) would have to incur a debt, of over U.S $2billion, to adequately fund the procurement of capital equipment, required to mine her iron ore in commercial quantity, given this instance. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that, other sectors could witness a gross or outright inattention if this scenario becomes a reality. Although good economic planners would always avoid, this sought of a scenario.
On the other hand, given a best-case scenario, where Nigerian policymakers agree to procure (import) only two mining equipment; a mine and main mine equipment, (e.g. soil compactor and front-end loaders, respectively), a unit each, owing to the reasons, earlier stated in the worse-case scenario and given Nigeria"s Gross Domestic Product as at the last quarter of 2018. In monetary terms, this implies that the central government would spend not less than U. S$ 626,446,597million, on the purchase of mining equipment, only. In fact, the central government would have to, incur a debt of U.S $626,348,997.65, if they must keep up with their agreement. Given another best-case scenario, where the policymakers, agrees to the purchase, of only, a unit of mining equipment (e.g. excavator).
Monetary-wise, this implies that the central government would spend not less than, U.S $316,943,338, on the purchase of mining equipment, only. Consequently, incurring debt, to the tune of U.S $316,845,778.65 would be unavoidable, if the central government sticks to its agreement. The two best-case scenarios, could be said, to be more realistic than the worse-case scenario, given that, some of the mining equipment, earlier purchased for the operation of Nigeria's iron ore company, NIOMCO, (which is moribund at the moment), have been exposed, to a long period of rainfall, since the year, 2011, Osemenam and Afeni (2018) . Hence, its engine would be down. Based on this, it is not illogical to assume that, at least one or two mining equipment, would be needed if extraction is to take-off again. Nevertheless, it is quite interesting that, given the least best-case scenario (i.e. the purchase of only one large capacity mining equipment), capital equipment attracts a money-value, far greater than the National income of an oil exporting nation, like Nigeria.
Although, an alternative source of finance that is opened for the sustenance of iron ore production, is Nigeria"s foreign exchange reserves, which stood at $43billion, as at, the 4th quarter of 2018, NBS (2018). However, utilizing this source could be detrimental to the sustenance of monetary policy by Nigeria"s monetary authority (Central Bank of Nigeria), if the prices of crude oil in the global market, remains unchanged or declines further. Anyways, the scenarios described above indicate that:
i. Importation is the most feasible source for Nigeria's earthmoving equipment at the moment.
ii. However much, Nigerian policymakers agree to limit the importation of earthmoving equipment for iron ore mining. Incurring debt is still inevitable, with respect to the current value of Nigeria"s national income.
Although modern economics promotes debt financing. However, it is important that Nigeria, yields to the warning of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), owing to her outrageous, debt profile of N22.3trillion
(approximately, $64,722,222,222 billion) as at June 30, 2018, amid her plan to diversify, the economy. To avoid a debt crisis, Clara and Chijioke (2018) .
iii. Hence, sustaining the financing of earthmoving equipment and its spare parts (mining technology) could lead to a decrease in the appropriation of funds to other sectors in the economy and possibly increase its debt by an amount beyond the estimates derived in the hypothetical scenarios given above.
iv. The extraction or mining of iron ore is extremely expensive. In fact, in Nigeria"s case, its costs could be termed "outrageous". Owing to the effective exchange rate differentials, between Nigeria and her importing partners. These are indicators, which, Nigerian policymakers need to be sensitive to.
For whom to produce vs Nigeria's Iron Ore Production
Ordinarily, in Economics, the usage of the phrase, "for whom to produce', implies, identifying that proportion of the consuming public, expected to utilize a commodity to be produced. Hence, production is skewed towards, the group characteristic(s) of the identified consuming public. In one word, the above definition could be said to imply "Demand or Market". However, in Marketing, it is, at best, referred to as, "Target market".
Within the context of this write-up, the definition of the phrase "for whom to produce' takes a little tweak. As it is described to be an "indirect input" with respect to Nigeria"s iron ore extraction. How? An input implies factor(s) of production such as labour or capital which goes into production. These factors are needed in production or go into production because, they are required to sustain the production of a commodity or needed to sustain the processes, surrounding the production of a commodity. As labour and capital are needed in sustaining, the production of any commodity so is the market (for whom to produce or demand), needed in the sustenance of a commodity. To put it simply, no firm goes into production, without identifying its potential market or demand. Therefore, the market for a commodity is factored in its production. One attribute is common to both factors (i.e. a factor of production and the market or for whom to produce, as a factor of production) in production, which is; they are both "needed or required" in the sustenance of production. This qualifies both factors, to be called "inputs". Although, "the market or for whom to produce" isn"t a direct input to production, because it isn"t required directly in production. At best, it could be seen as "indirect" because, it is outside of production, but required or needed to sustain the production of a commodity. Simply put, every firm needs the patronage of the market or its market, to be able to sustain the production of any commodity.
The description above is directly applied to the context of "for whom to produce vs Nigeria"s iron ore extraction". Interestingly, in this context, "for whom to produce or the demand for Nigeria"s iron ore concentrates (NIOMCO"s iron ore concentrates), isn"t, the international market (demand) for iron ore concentrates, rather they are, Nigeria"s steel companies. To be precise, they are, Ajaokuta and Aladja Steel companies, sited in Kogi and Delta
States, respectively. These companies could be said to be "indirect inputs", to NIOMCO"s operation, because they are necessary or needed, to sustain its operation (iron ore extraction), just as, labour and capital.
Identifying, both steel companies, as the potential demand or market, for Nigeria"s iron ore concentrates, is informed by the Decree No. 60 of 19th, September 1979. This decree, made the supply of iron ore concentrates to both steel companies, the priority of Nigeria's iron ore company (NIOMCO). Unfortunately, these companies aren"t functioning at the moment, owing to various challenges, (See, (Elijah, 2013; Ganiyu, 2015) ). This implies that the market for Nigeria's iron ore concentrates, which is an "indirect input', to NIOMCO's operation, isn't available at the moment. So, for whom, does Nigeria's iron ore company seek to produce for, where its market by law, isn"t there?
Hence, actualizing the goal of improving Nigeria"s industrial base, through the production of steel is sabotaged. opposed to the capacity of Nigeria"s actual demand or market for iron concentrates by law, which stands at 2,700,000 metric tons of iron ore concentrates. The existence of these market would have been an incentive, to keep the possibility of sustaining, Nigeria's iron ore production, alive. However, it relies on scrap metals, at the moment, which is a substitute for steel (output of the non-functional, Nigerian steel companies). This output (steel), needs the output from, iron ore production (which is called iron ore concentrates), for steel to be produced.
For simplicity, let"s assume that Nigeria begins the production of iron ore concentrates, in anticipation, to win over the patronage of, existing private steel firms. It isn"t illogical, at this point, to conclude that; since these firms have a substitute raw material (scrap metal), that sustains their production already, there must be more appealing incentive (e.g. reduction in price of iron ore concentrate, per wagon), to induce these firms, to reduce or stop, their demand for scrap metals, in place of iron ore concentrates. The chances of realising this is very slim in the shortrun, where Nigeria has no, readily available control over; the fabrication of spare parts (such as sprockets, gears, bearings), frequently exposed to wear and tear during mining, the sufficient technical know-how to fix earthmoving equipment, during a breakdown. Definitely, these would be absorbed into the price of the commodity (iron ore concentrates), at least to sustain the variable cost accruable to iron ore production, overtime. In effect, the prices of iron ore concentrates would increase. In response, the private steel companies, being sensitive to a price increase, would choose to sustain its demand, for scrap metal, rather than patronize, Nigeria"s iron ore concentrates. This scenario could defeat the expectation of sustaining iron ore production, even in the private market. 
